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 VUT v Wilson, UWA v Gray and university 
intellectual property policies 
William van Caenegem* 
Introduction 
On 3 September 2009, the Full Court of the Federal Court (Lindgren, Finn and Bennett JJ) handed 
down its reasons for dismissing the University of Western Australia’s (UWA) appeal against the trial 
decision of French J in University of Western Australia v Gray (No 20) (2008) 76 IPR 222; [2008] 
FCA 498 (UWA v Gray). Special leave to appeal to the High Court was later refused. As on the facts 
as found, none of the inventions were actually made during the period of Dr Gray’s employment, this 
was not the proper case for consideration of university ownership of academic inventions.1  
 The most significant questions on the appeal were whether the inventions, the subject of the suit, 
were made by Dr Gray during his period of employment by the university, and if so, whether Dr Gray 
as the inventor or the university as his employer owned those inventions, which had been patented by 
Dr Gray. Also in issue were alleged breaches of specified fiduciary duties by Dr Gray. However, the 
particular breaches pleaded related to the misuse of university intellectual property, so they required 
little further consideration once the Full Court confirmed French J’s decision that the inventions were 
in fact Dr Gray’s own property. Dr Gray had been successful on all points at the trial. 
 Universities do not normally intend reliance on the common law to found their claims to 
ownership of academic inventions, but instead expressly provide for university ownership, usually by 
incorporation of the terms of a university statute or policy to that effect into academic employment 
contracts. In this case, however, French J held that the UWA Patent Regulations had not been validly 
passed or incorporated, and therefore the common law applied. The trial judge’s findings in relation 
to the UWA Patent Regulations were not challenged on the appeal.  
 The Patents Act 1990 (Cth), provides that in some circumstances parties other than the inventor 
will be entitled to an assignment of a patent.2 The Act is mute on what those circumstances are, and in 
the absence of express contractual terms any claim to ownership by an entity other than the inventor 
must therefore be resolved by applying relevant common law principles (the default law).  
 In the industrial and commercial sector employers normally benefit from such an entitlement 
where an employment contract specifies a duty to invent, and/or a duty to conduct research for the 
employer. The question here was whether the same would apply in the academic sector. 
Patent ownership 
During the hearing of UWA’s special leave application before Gummow, Hayne and Haydon JJ,3 
counsel for UWA made something of the principles expounded in Sterling Engineering Co Ltd v 
Patchett [1955] AC 534. That case remains a most persuasive authority in relation to the principles 
underlying employee ownership of inventions. Some few Australian courts have considered the 
matter.4 Of these, Nettle J’s recent Victorian Supreme Court decision in Victoria University of 
Technology v Wilson (2004) 60 IPR 392; [2004] VSC 33 (VUT v Wilson), also relating to academic 
inventions, was clearly most on point.  
 Two passages from Sterling alert us to key principles: Viscount Simonds pointed out that 
ownership will fall to the employer if inventions are “made by the employee in the course of his 
 
* Professor of Law, Bond University; Visiting Professor, Faculty of Business and Law, University of Gothenburg.. My thanks 
to Jim Corkery, Chris Arup and John Farrar for helpful comments on this article. 
1 University of Western Australia v Gray [2010] HCATrans 11. 
2 Patents Act 1990 (Cth), s 15(1): Subject to this Act, a patent for an invention may only be granted to a person who: … 
(b) would, on the grant of a patent for the invention, be entitled to have the patent assigned to the person. 
3 University of Western Australia v Gray [2010] HCATrans 11, p 2. 
4 For example, Spencer Industries Pty Ltd v Collins (2003) 58 IPR 425; [2003] FCA 542. 
employment which it was part of his duty to make” (Sterling at 544). And Lord Reid said (at 547) that 
it is: 
inherent in the legal relationship of master and servant that any product of the work which the servant 
is paid to do belongs to the master: I can find neither principle nor authority for holding that this role 
ceases to apply if a product of that work happens to be a patentable invention.  
 The approach of both judges rests on an analogy between physical and intellectual labour: what 
an employee “produces by the strength of his arm or the skill of his hand or the exercise of his 
inventive faculty shall become the property of his employer” (at 544 per Viscount Simonds).  
 The recent decisions in UWA v Gray and VUT v Wilson both considered how these principles 
were to be applied to academics whose contracts specify a duty to research, but not expressly to 
invent. Is the employing university entitled to the fruits of that research in those circumstances? VUT, 
like UWA had failed to do what was required to effectively incorporate university patent policies into 
the contract of academic employment. The answer was thus to be found in the cases, and in this 
regard VUT v Wilson presaged the decision in UWA v Gray. But the two decisions proceeded along 
rather different lines, both in terms of ownership and of fiduciary duties. 
The approach in VUT v Wilson 
The decision in VUT v Wilson proceeded on the basis that the fruits of an academic’s paid research 
might well fall to the employing university. But this depended upon “the nature of the research that 
the employee is retained to perform” (VUT v Wilson at [108]). The content of the duty to research “is 
informed by the business of the employer”, which in the case of Professor Wilson was the “business” 
of the School of Applied Economics. Nettle J then held that inventing internet based e-commerce 
systems was never part of the School’s business, which was instead confined to typical academic 
research resulting in “preparation and presentation of peer reviewed learned papers” (at [110]). 
 Even though the development of the electronic trading system was close to the fields of 
economics and international trade Professor Wilson was expected to research in, it was not research 
of the kind he was retained to perform: this was instead “intellectual analysis which typifies social 
science academic inquiry” and not of a kind that could result in patentable inventions (at [116]).  
 Therefore the inventive activity was not “sufficiently closely related to [the social science 
research activity] or springs so naturally from [it] as for some purposes to be treated as if it were part 
of [it]” (at [112]). Further, although the nature of an employee’s duties can change over time and must 
be assessed by reference to the work actually performed at the relevant time, and Professor Wilson 
had the capacity as Head of Department to accept the work on the inventions as being included in the 
duties he and his colleague performed on behalf of the university, by the time the inventions were 
mad he had determined within his authority that the work would be continued in a private capacity. 
The approach in UWA v Gray 
The trial in UWA v Gray, and for the most part also the appeal, proceeded on the basis that Dr Gray’s 
contract of employment contained neither an implied nor express duty to invent. French J stressed the 
quite fundamental distinction between an academic employee’s duty to conduct research which might 
admittedly very well result in the making of an invention, and an actual duty to pursue and make 
inventions with an eye to commercial exploitation by the employer. He did not accept that a duty to 
conduct research invoked a right of the employer to the fruits of that research.  
 In this, UWA v Gray differs from VUT v Wilson: the latter case proceeded on the basis that if the 
research that the academic was paid to undertake was of a kind which would normally result in the 
making of inventions, the university would have a valid claim to own them. The key inquiry 
according to VUT v Wilson was what kind of research the academic was paid to pursue. The case left 
open the possibility that the inventions of academics retained to research in “areas of the university 
[that] were involved in the sorts of practical or applied research that are relevant to the development 
and implementation” (VUT v Wilson at [111]) of practical inventions of the kind they in fact made, 
would be owned by the university. Physical sciences and information technology were given as 
examples of such departments. However, UWA v Gray does not accept this possibility.  
 Dr Gray’s research into cancer treatment was indeed of an applied and practical kind, and not 
social science research. Nonetheless French J, concluded that academic employment was always 
inconsistent with any right of the university to own inventions, and therefore Dr Gray retained 
ownership of them. The Full Court agreed wholly with his reasoning on this point. In other words, 
subsequent to UWA v Gray even where the university can establish that the research an academic is 
paid to conduct is in the applied sciences and likely to result in practical and potentially patentable 
inventions, the employing university simply has no claim to ownership of such inventions.5 The 
reasoning in UWA v Gray which led to this different result is examined in more detail below. 
Inventions resulting from academic research 
The case before the trial judge and on appeal proceeded on the agreed basis “that there was no express 
or implied contractual obligation imposing on Dr Gray a ‘duty to invent’ ”.6 It seems, however, that 
under questioning from the Bench, the presence of such an implied duty was in fact asserted by UWA 
at the close of the appeal case, in the following terms: “at least in the applied sciences, the duty to 
invent is relevant to a duty to research in the sense that the latter comprehends ‘a duty to make 
advances in the art’ and that such a duty is, in fact, a duty to invent”.7 
 This was a twist on the approach hitherto taken, which was that employer ownership of resulting 
inventions can be implied even if a contract of employment requires an academic only to research, not 
to invent. It was in line with the approach in VUT v Wilson which calls for an inquiry into whether the 
research the academic was paid to undertake was of a kind that would normally result in patentable 
inventions. The research contemplated by the contract of employment in UWA v Gray was certainly 
of a more practical and applied kind, not social science research as in VUT v Wilson, although 
admittedly, medical research often does result only in the publication of papers.8 
 French J held that whereas in industry and commerce employer ownership would normally 
follow from salaried research, in the university sector it would not. He stressed the inherent 
differences between research conducted in universities and in primarily commercial organisations, 
something the Full Court was also emphatic about. In this view, the distinct characteristics of 
academic research as an employment duty derive from the unique role and position of universities in 
society.9  
 Most importantly, academic research direction is a matter of personal discretion, and not 
determined by the need to make inventions. This is not consistent with a duty to invent as might be 
imposed upon a person employed to do research in industry, even in the absence of an express term to 
that effect. In other words, even though an academic is free to fulfil her duty to do research by 
pursuing technologies, practical applications, inventions or innovations,10 none is contractually 
obliged to pursue this route. Even in the sciences an academic can choose to research wholly in areas 
without commercial implications of any kind. The duty to research is traditionally fulfilled in other 
ways, most notably by publication of results.11 More generally, an academic researcher such as Dr 
 
5 This is where the contract of employment only requires research, and not a duty to make inventions. This is also where there 
is no express term dealing with ownership of inventions. 
6 University of Western Australia v Gray (2009) 179 FCR 346 at [124]; [2009] FCAFC 116. 
7 University of Western Australia v Gray (2009) 179 FCR 346 at [124]; [2009] FCAFC 116. 
8 Dr Gray’s contract contained the following specified duties, common to all appointed Chairs at UWA: “A Professor will be a 
full-time officer of the University and will be required to devote his whole time to his University duties except in so far as he 
undertakes private and consultative work (as to which see clause 11). He will be responsible where applicable to the Head of 
the Department and will be required – (i) to teach, to conduct examinations and to direct and supervise the work in his field in 
accordance with the Statutes and regulations of the University and the directions of the Senate; (ii) to undertake research and to 
organise and generally stimulate research among the staff and students; and (iii) to perform such other appropriate work as the 
Senate from time to time determines.” 
9 See Monotti and Ricketson, Universities and Intellectual Property: Ownership and Exploitation (OUP, 2003), [6.67]. 
10 And pursuing patents and maintaining secrecy is one legitimate incident of choosing this type of research. 
11 Open publication and sharing being a valid way of diffusing technologies and innovations, something that is expressly 
recognised in some university IP regulations: see eg, Harvard Office of Technology Development, Intellectual Property Policy, 
Introduction, in particular the first principle there mentioned, http://www.techtransfer.harvard.edu/resources/policies/IP/. 
Gray was not obliged “to advance the commercial purpose” of his employer, UWA (UWA v Gray at 
[1362]).12  
 Further, as stressed repeatedly in the reasons of both trial and appeal courts, if the academic 
employee were under a duty to invent, then that employee would be under an implicit obligation to 
maintain confidentiality to the extent a patent application requires it. Such an obligation of secrecy or 
silence “sits uncomfortably with the notion of ‘academic freedom’, shared ownership and free 
exchange of research results” (UWA v Gray at [159]).13  
In fact it is clear that it would result in a clash between an implied duty to keep inventions secret, and 
the duty, arguably central to academic research, to publish. Such a clash could be fatally disruptive of 
the role of universities in society. It would also be incompatible with the unquestioned freedom, and 
the vested practice, of academics collaborating with those employed by other institutions. This 
collaboration as well is an essential feature of the pursuit of knowledge in the public interest.  
Are academic employment contracts a distinct type? 
It may be somewhat artificial not to conduct the inquiry in terms of whether a duty to invent can be 
implied, but instead to ask, as was done in UWA v Gray, whether as a matter of law, a term granting 
employer ownership of inventions should be implied into all contracts of employment requiring 
research. UWA contended that that was the case, regardless of the activity or business of the 
employer, and that accordingly academics were under the same implied duty to assign inventions 
resulting from their research as researchers in industry, in line with the principle in Sterling. The 
artificiality averted to lies in the fact that if an employer ownership term is implied in this manner 
researchers must by inference be under a duty to invent. 
 Leaving that aside, French J answered the question whether Dr Gray’s “employment contract 
[was] one of a class or type in which the employee invention term would be implied”14 with a 
resounding “no”, and for the following reasons (UWA v Gray at [1366]). 
1. The absence of any duty to invent anything.  
2. The freedom to publish the results of his research and any invention developed during that research 
notwithstanding that such publication might destroy the patentability of the invention.  
3. The extent to which Dr Gray , as a researcher and those working with him, were expected to and did 
solicit funds for their research, including the development of inventions, from sources outside 
UWA. The relevance of those considerations is not affected by the arrangements under which UWA 
would administer funding, eg in the case of CSIRO or NH & MRC grants.  
4. The necessity, consistent with research of the kind he was doing, to enter into collaborative 
arrangements with external organisations such as CSIRO.15  
 The Full Court essentially endorsed this answer: an academic employment contract is a distinct 
type, because universities are distinctive institutions and because academic employment has 
distinctive features.16 The essential reasons supporting the Full Court’s conclusion can be summarised 
as: the essentially public nature of universities; the academic freedom to choose research direction 
and to publish; and the routine pursuit of external funding and collaboration. These are dealt with in 
turn below. 
Universities as public institutions 
Universities such as UWA serve the public purpose by offering education, research facilities and 
awarding degrees. Although UWA had taken on many and various commercial activities, these had 
not displaced its traditional functions to the extent that it became “limited to that of engaging 
 
12 See University of Western Australia v Gray (2009) 179 FCR 346 at [171]. 
13 See University of Western Australia v Gray (2009) 179 FCR 346 at [169]. 
14 See University of Western Australia v Gray (2009) 179 FCR 346 at [181]. 
15 University of Western Australia v Gray (2009) 179 FCR 346 at [173]. 
16 University of Western Australia v Gray (2009) 179 FCR 346 at [181]-[188]. 
academic staff for its own commercial purposes”.17 The same can be said of other universities: 
commercial activities such as commercialisation of research outcomes remain a means to an end 
rather than the end in itself for academic institutions. 
 Also distinctive is that academic staff are often part of the “membership that constitutes the 
corporation and as such are bound by the statutes, regulations etc of the university”.18 This was true of 
staff at UWA but as mentioned in the decision, not necessarily true of all universities. 
Academic freedom to choose research direction and to publish 
The most distinctive features of the employment relationship fixed upon by the Full Court and 
emphasised below by French J are the freedoms of academics to set and pursue research priorities and 
to publish or share research results. These freedoms collide fatally with a duty to maintain the secrecy 
which employer patent ownership inevitably requires.19 Either an implied term favouring university 
ownership would be freestanding, ie, “unsupported by a duty of confidence”,20 in which case it would 
oddly mean that the academic “would have been free to destroy the potential patentability of an 
invention by progressively putting research results into the public domain”.21 Alternatively it would 
be supported by an obligation of confidence, which is something so manifestly in opposition with 
traditional academic freedoms and practices that it cannot be maintained.  
 Either alternative is absurd enough to demonstrate that implying university ownership faces 
insuperable problems.  
 The Full Court stresses that the duty of confidence and the patent system are intimately 
intertwined: the “duty of confidence … buttresses and supplements the patent system by providing 
‘trade secrets’ protection (i) before a patent has been applied for, and (ii) in relation to ideas and 
concepts which for some reason cannot be patented”.22 It sets out the law concerning breach of 
confidence for employees in some detail, stressing that it does so to emphasise the point that an 
employee who is engaged in an inventive capacity for the benefit of his employer will commonly 
obtain or generate confidential information which she would be precluded from communicating to 
others without prior consent. Plainly that type of restriction did not apply in this case of academic 
employment in research and teaching.  
 Significantly, the Full Court also points out: 
 [W]hat is important to note for present purposes is that the duty of confidence can pose a significant 
obstacle to the mobility of employees engaged in research-related employment having applications in 
science and technology.23  
 Presumably this is a further argument against importing into academic employment contracts the 
kind of obligation of secrecy which would be implicit if such employees had a duty to invent and 
patent, and the university employer owned such output. 
 The Full Court also stresses that it would be odd to imply that the university would own the 
results of tasks that Dr Gray’s contract “did not even require him to perform” since his research 
direction and approach was a matter for his discretion.24 
 
17 University of Western Australia v Gray (2009) 179 FCR 346 at [184]. 
18 University of Western Australia v Gray (2009) 179 FCR 346 at [185]. 
19 Since employer ownership can only be based on a duty to invent, and a duty to invent necessarily implies a duty of 
confidentiality, either to preserve the value of the employer’s trade secrets as such, or to enable the employer to obtain a valid 
and commercial patent. 
20 See University of Western Australia v Gray (2009) 179 FCR 346 at [191]. 
21 University of Western Australia v Gray (2009) 179 FCR 346 at [192]. 
22 University of Western Australia v Gray (2009) 179 FCR 346 at [166]. 
23 University of Western Australia v Gray (2009) 179 FCR 346 at [164]. 
24 University of Western Australia v Gray (2009) 179 FCR 346 at [195]. 
 External funding and collaboration  
Also inconsistent with the implied term UWA contended for, and common in universities, was the 
fact that Dr Gray and his academic associates spent a very great deal of time and effort attracting 
funding from external sources. This meant that much of the research although undertaken at the 
university and by him in his capacity as an employee was actually not funded by UWA. As the Full 
Court points out “UWA may have wished to foster, but seemingly could not fund, Dr Gray’s 
research”.25 Although administered by UWA it “can probably be inferred that the grants were made to 
Dr Gray as an established researcher and not to UWA as such”.26  
 That much of the research undertaken by Dr Gray was collaborative with external researchers 
also militated against the conclusion that the academic employment contract was of a type that 
required or necessitated the implication of employer-ownership. Collaboration is a common or even 
inevitable incident of all such research pursuits within the academy. According to the Full Court, this 
fact was implicitly and correctly relied upon by French J as telling against “the exclusive 
appropriation of its product to one institution”.27 
 The Full Court agreed with every aspect of French J’s reasoning in relation to ownership. It 
approvingly cites passages from his reasons and reiterates his points about the nature of academe and 
universities. However, that the trial and appeal courts are united and settled in their conclusions is not 
to say that the Full Court was wholly satisfied with the outcome. It also recognises that the common 
law allows only for a black and white solution, ie either the employee or the employer fully owns the 
invention – shared ownership, a “shop right”,28 or a royalty right can only be based in contract and not 
on the common law.  
 If the approach UWA agitated for had been preferred, the employee would have absolutely no 
right to participate in potential commercial success. In contrast, sharing and participation is something 
that university intellectual property policies or regulations commonly provide for. If UWA had won 
on appeal it would have got more than if the validity of its own Patent Regulations had been upheld! 
 On a final note, the Full Court also emphasises a significant matter not earlier considered, which 
is the connection between teaching and research at a university: 
As the Professor of Surgery, Dr Gray had teaching and supervisory responsibilities to students. The 
extent to which the proper discharge of those responsibilities by a person in Dr Gray’s position could 
or would require the sharing and dissemination of research results etc was not a matter raised before us, 
or, seemingly, before French J. It is almost unnecessary to add that it is the coalescence of teaching 
(with its dissemination of knowledge) and research (with its generation of knowledge) that is so 
characteristic of universities and (save in the case of the university researcher with no teaching 
responsibilities at all) differentiates the university academic from the researcher in private enterprise.29  
Fiduciary duties 
At trial, breach of a number of fiduciary duties was pleaded by UWA,30 which French J said “rested 
upon the premise that Dr Gray was dealing for his own benefit with rights in relation to various 
inventions which UWA owned or in which UWA had an interest” (UWA v Gray at [1567]). Because 
his Honour had previously concluded that the university had no such proprietary interests, the critical 
premise founding the breach of duty allegations fell away. The Full Court did little more than agree 
25 University of Western Australia v Gray (2009) 179 FCR 346 at [200]. 
26University of Western Australia v Gray (2009) 179 FCR 346 at [200]. 
27 University of Western Australia v Gray (2009) 179 FCR 346 at [204]. 
28 In the United States, the “shop right” gives a royalty free license to the employer in some cases. 
29 See University of Western Australia v Gray (2009) 179 FCR 346 at [123]. 
30 They were (a) a duty to deal with the property rights and interests of the university so as to protect and preserve that property 
and those rights and interests for the university; (b) a duty not to make any secret profit or receive any secret payment or obtain 
any secret benefit from any third party with whom he was dealing; (c) a duty to account for any such secret profit or secret 
payment or benefit; and (d) the duties of a trustee of such of the university’s assets and property as were in his possession or 
control and/or under his direction from time to time. 
with French J in relation to the fiduciary duties as pleaded. In any case, counsel for UWA was said to 
have conceded that if the university could not establish property or rights “in the inventions, in the 
right to apply for the patents, or in antecedent trade secrets which comprised the respective 
inventions” it had no case in relation to breach of duty.31 
The approach to fiduciary duties in VUT v Wilson 
Because of the way in which narrow and specific duties were pleaded in UWA v Gray, there was no 
consideration of any possible breach of fiduciary duties other than by misuse of (intellectual) property 
belonging to the employer. As pointed out on the appeal, UWA v Gray was not pleaded on the basis of 
“misappropriated ‘opportunities’ ”.32 and this stands in contrast with the approach taken in VUT v 
Wilson. In that case the opportunity to develop a computer system was held to have come to Professor 
Wilson in his university capacity, the external parties who approached him being interested in an 
association with VUT as such. The professor had initially worked on it as a university project but then 
took it over and completed it in his personal capacity, acquiring patents over the relevant technology 
as a result. That constituted a breach of fiduciary duty. 
 The court in VUT v Wilson (at [152]) quoted from Queensland Mines Ltd v Hudson (1978) 18 
ALR 1 at 3 to the effect that it was necessary to examine the facts “to determine whether (the 
fiduciary) acted in a way in which ‘there was a real sensible possibility of conflict’ between his 
interest and the interest of (the principal)”.33 From that perspective, it was important to determine 
whether VUT had the willingness and capacity to carry out the project. Nettle J found that if the 
higher authorities in the university had been notified, they would have approved the project and 
tasked Professor Wilson and his associate to complete it. Plainly they had the capacity to do so, as 
that is what they actually accomplished in short order on their own behalf.  
The approach to fiduciary duties in UWA v Gray 
French J was not called upon to consider whether academic employees occupy a fiduciary position at 
all, but simply to assess the specific duties pleaded. Nettle J in his examination of the question in VUT 
v Wilson concluded that academics were similar to professional employees, who, although entitled to 
do other work, as such owe their employers “fiduciary obligations not to profit from their position at 
the expense of the employer and to avoid conflicts of interest and duty” (VUT v Wilson at [149]). 
Nettle J did not limit this to academics who occupy a management position: in Professor Wilson’s 
case, Head of the School of Applied Economics and Head of the Centre for International Business 
Research and Education. However, if a central question is whether an opportunity comes to an 
academic in their personal or their university capacity, then the latter is more likely to be the case 
where the academic occupies a general management position such as Head of Department.  
 In any case, had the approach in UWA v Gray mirrored that in VUT v Wilson, it would have 
required first considering whether Dr Gray, as an academic employee, occupied a fiduciary position; 
then construing the exact nature of his fiduciary duties as such; and finally resolving whether he had 
acted in accordance with those duties.  
 Nettle J points out in VUT v Wilson (at [152]): “A fiduciary is not necessarily precluded from 
taking advantage of every opportunity of which he or she learns as a consequence of their fiduciary 
position.” In an earlier passage he asserts that the exact scope of fiduciary obligations depends on an 
individual’s contractual duties: “The scope of an employee’s fiduciary duties to the employer depends 
as much as anything upon the nature and terms of the employment” (at [145]). This approach would 
require framing Dr Gray’s fiduciary duties by reference to the work his contract required him to 
 
31 See University of Western Australia v Gray (2009) 179 FCR 346 at [214]. 
32 University of Western Australia v Gray (2009) 179 FCR 346 at [214]. 
33 See also Victoria University of Technology v Wilson (2004) 60 IPR 392 at [149]; [2004] VSC 33 per Nettle J: “a professional 
employee remains bound to account to the employer for gains derived as a result of the employee’s fiduciary position and for 
opportunities of which the employee may learn in the course of employment; lest the employee otherwise be swayed by 
considerations of personal interest.” 
 perform: to teach; conduct research; and “to organise and generally stimulate research among the staff 
and students”.34  
 A critical difference with Professor Wilson is obviously that Dr Gray’s work did not include 
managing a department, unit or faculty. The duty to teach is of no consequence here. As for the duty 
to conduct research, the decisions in UWA v Gray held that an academic researcher is free to set 
research direction and has no duty to invent, and no employer ownership term can be implied into an 
academic research contract. In that light, the academic researcher cannot be under a fiduciary duty to 
give the employer the opportunity to commercialise inventions, since he is under no obligation to 
pursue or produce them in the first place.  
 As to his duty to organise and stimulate research amongst staff and students, it is difficult to 
conceive of anything Dr Gray did being in conflict with that duty or somehow profiting for himself 
rather than performing this duty. 
Reductionist approach to fiduciary duties? 
However, we have to guard against a reductionist approach here; there is no point in so-called 
fiduciary duties that do not in truth rise above implied contractual obligations. As Conaglen argues, 
only some commonly pleaded duties are in truth peculiarly fiduciary in nature, these being: 
the principle that prohibits a fiduciary from acting in a situation in which there is a conflict between the 
duty that he owes to his principal and his personal interest; and secondly, the principle that prohibits a 
fiduciary from receiving any unauthorised profit as a result of the fiduciary position.35  
 In terms of employment, the question is whether VUT v Wilson’s classification of all academic 
employees as “in a fiduciary position” means they owe more than all employees’ duty to carry out 
their contractual duties with good faith or fidelity. Nettle J’s statement that the nature of fiduciary 
obligations of an employee depends as much as anything “upon the nature and terms of the 
employment” (VUT v Wilson at [145] (see above)), risks hollowing out his conclusion that academics 
are in a fiduciary position to such an extent that it is essentially meaningless. 
 The critical question here therefore must lie in the second limb of Conaglen’s identification, and 
be whether, despite the absence of a duty to invent, the requirement that the academic employee avoid 
receiving an unauthorised profit as a result of his fiduciary position is breached, in the particular 
factual circumstances of the case, by unilaterally patenting and commercialising an invention made in 
his capacity of employed researcher. 
 As Nettle J pointed out, academics are entitled to do other work, and to profit from it; but does 
that mean they are able to profit from work which they carry on in their capacity as employees, that 
is, as salaried researchers, while denying their employer any opportunity to so profit? Alternatively, 
while it may be correct to say that the employee here did not misuse university intellectual property to 
so profit, what about other university facilities, co-workers input, networks and support?  
An academic’s “position as fiduciary”: What does it mean? 
Perhaps the essential character of an academic’s “position as fiduciary” is founded not so directly in 
the nature of his duties, but in the great freedom of research, collaboration and fund-raising, in 
autonomy of judgment and decision making. An incident of this freedom may arguably be that he has 
a fiduciary obligation not to deny his employer the opportunity to benefit from commercially valuable 
advantages that come his way.36 Without suggesting that this was the case for Dr Gray, would it be 
right, for instance, for an employed academic researcher to take advantage of his freedom to set 
research direction and support it with external finance, to spend all his time on pursuing commercially 
valuable inventions, which he then turned to his own account without telling the university a thing 
about it?  
 
34 See n 8. 
35 See Conaglen M, “Fiduciary Loyalty: Protecting the due Performance of Non-fiduciary Duties” (Hart, Oxford, 2010) p 39. 
36 I leave aside here the question whether or not Dr Gray in fact did seriously engage with the university in relation to 
commercialisation of the inventions. 
  
 After all, the opportunity to profit from the inventions comes to these employees in their position 
as salaried academic researchers, which forms the linchpin of all their activities; in terms of Chan v 
Zacharia (1984) 154 CLR 178 at 199; [1984] HCA 36 at [24] per Deane J: “[it] was obtained or 
received by use or by reason of his fiduciary position or of opportunity or knowledge resulting from 
it”. If all employed academics are indeed in a fiduciary position, as Nettle J suggests, then they 
arguably fall into a conflict of interest by exploiting the patent opportunity unilaterally, because the 
opportunity comes to them when roaming free in the research which they are being payed as 
professional employees to conduct with a considerable degree of autonomy. 
 Leaving the technicalities aside, academic researchers today are generally aware of universities’ 
interest in pursuing opportunities to commercialise, or at least review its employees’ inventions for 
that purpose, and of the importance of such opportunities to the continuing development and financial 
situation of the university. Intellectual property policies generally have this aim front and centre. In 
this case it was only the opportune failure of the intellectual property statute of UWA that resulted in 
the commercialisation of the research by Dr Gray alone. Thus, although not deprived of a property 
right, perhaps UWA did miss out on an opportunity to participate that it could legitimately expect to 
be offered, even if only on a first refusal basis. This point is pursued further below. 
When were the inventions made?  
A passage from the Full Court’s reasons (reproduced above) refers to the significance of the questions 
raised by this case for the mobility of employees in the R & D sector.37 How the law resolves 
competing claims over knowledge acquired or conceived by employees, whether in the form of 
unwritten know-how, inchoate ideas or patentable inventions, is generally very important.38 One 
factor in resolving competing claims is the determination of when an invention is made for the 
purposes of the patent law. With a mobile workforce in the R & D sector, it will not be uncommon for 
an invention to be mentally conceived in one organisation and then reduced to a practicable form, 
tested, circumscribed and claimed in a patent application when an inventor is already employed 
somewhere else.  
 On the hearing of the special leave application, the High Court actively pursued this issue, 
because if none of the inventions were made when Dr Gray was employed by UWA, the contested 
ownership did not need to be considered.39 At trial, Dr Gray had argued, with a very large measure of 
success, that the relevant inventions were made prior to his engagement. French J held that only one 
of the disputed inventions was made during his term of employment, but expressed uncertainty as to 
whether Dr Gray’s contribution to it was sufficient to qualify him as an inventor.  
 The choice was between holding that the invention was made either at the time of mental 
conception, or of either the reduction to practice (commonly through application and testing of the 
idea) or the redaction of specific claims in a patent application. The former approach tends to place 
the relevant moment at the earlier intellectual stage rather than the application, prototyping, testing or 
commercialisation stage of R & D. In other words, on an orthodox view of the innovation process, it 
will be resolved by reference to a point earlier in the invention – innovation – commercialisation 
cycle. It will also mean that where gestation, testing and trials of inventions take very long,40 one 
might have to go quite far back in time to examine the circumstances that gave rise to the invention. 
Keeping in mind that frequently there are multiple intellectual contributors to the invention process,41 
 
37 See text accompanying n 23. 
38 See van Caenegem W, “Mobility of Creative Individuals, Trade Secrets and Restraints of Trade” (2007) 14(2) Murdoch 
University eLaw Journal 279. 
39 The application was rejected because the issue that UWA wanted to agitate (ie, employer ownership) did not actually arise on 
the view of the facts taken by the trial judge and the Full Court as to when the inventions were made. The fact finding in that 
regard “did not give rise to any special leave ground”: University of Western Australia v Gray [2010] HCATrans 11. 
40 Such as in the pharmaceutical and medical sectors, as in this case where the invention related to cancer treatment. 
41 Each of whom may qualify as co-inventors and therefore have an entitlement to be recorded as such in the patent application, 
and to shared ownership of the patent. 
 the resulting inquiry will often be attended by great complexity and uncertainty, requiring much 
historical evidence.  
 French J basically adopted the first approach: 
 first, identify the “inventive concept” by referring to the terms of the relevant specification (the 
latter consisting not only of claims but also of descriptions etc); and 
 secondly, ascertain the timing of the invention and identity of the inventor “by reference to that 
inventive concept”.42 
 The UWA approach at trial had been rather to focus on the claims, and more specifically the 
narrowest of the claims, as relevantly disclosing the invention. This approach pays less regard to 
mental conception and more to the process of reduction to practice, “some elements of which may 
have found their way into the claims in the application” (UWA v Gray at [1433]).43  
 In other words, French J adopted the broad approach, which was then endorsed by the Full Court, 
partly by reference to another recent decision of the same court in Polwood Pty Ltd v Foxworth Pty 
Ltd (2008) 165 FCR 527; 75 IPR 1.44 Therefore all inventions except one were said to have been 
made before Dr Gray was employed by UWA and were thus unassailably his. Of the other, it could 
not clearly be said that he was its co- inventor. 
Implications of UWA v Gray for other employees 
Implications concerning implied terms 
As indicated above, the trial judge and the Full Court were in agreement that academic employment 
contracts are a special category or class. They differ in very crucial respects from other forms of 
employment. The implications of the decisions for researchers employed in industry are therefore 
quite limited: the general principle expounded in Sterling continues to apply to them undiminished.  
 Crucially, researchers in industry will normally be hired to invent, ie to search for and arrive at 
new products and processes, whether patentable or not. Advancing the employer’s interests through 
R&D is central to the employment relationship. Even if a duty to invent is not specifically mentioned, 
a duty to research in that context is sufficient to found an employer-ownership implication. Industrial 
researchers generally conduct their research either upon specific instruction to solve particular 
problems, or within restricted parameters with limited discretion. The ability to freely choose research 
direction is limited, the exception rather than the norm, and if an employed researcher has such 
discretion at all, it will generally be quarantined from directed research work.  
 What remains most significant in industry is to determine whether a particular employee was 
employed to research or not: the terms of the contract of employment must be construed to identify 
the exact scope and nature of the employee’s duties. Often those duties are not clearly expressed, or 
only in the most general terms, or have evolved and mutated over time.45 Courts have tended to take a 
careful and narrow approach to construction here: for instance, in Spencer Industries Pty Ltd v Collins 
(2003) 58 IPR 425; [2003] FCA 542, where the sales manager learned of deficiencies with products 
from clients and devised improvements to them, these were considered to be his own inventions. As 
Sales Manager he was found to have a duty to use his technical skills to demonstrate products, but not 
to invent them or improve upon them. Nor had he been specifically directed to do so. The submission 
of Spencer Industries “that because Mr Collins had a duty as Sales Manager of Spencer Industries to 
advance the sales of Spencer Industries any invention made by him which was capable of advancing 
 
42 See University of Western Australia v Gray (2009) 179 FCR 346 at [221]. 
43 University of Western Australia v Gray (2009) 179 FCR 346 at [221]. 
44 See University of Western Australia v Gray (2009) 179 FCR 346  
45 See eg, Spencer Industries Pty Ltd v Collins (2003) 58 IPR 425; [2003] FCA 542, where there was no written contract at all 
for Collins who was a Sales Manager with Spencer Industries. The court held (at [78]) that therefore “in considering the scope 
of Mr Collins’ employment, it is necessary to give consideration to the nature and seniority of the employee’s position with 
Spencer Industries, the nature of his duties as Sales Manager and whether he received a specific directive relating to the 
invention.” 
Spencer Industries’ sales was an invention made by him within the course and scope of his 
employment” was rejected as “unacceptably broad in ambit” (at [82]). 
 Secondly, it will be important to determine whether the invention has a sufficient connection to 
the area or nature of the research which the employee is engaged to undertake. Employees who arrive 
at some breakthrough that is not connected to that research, may well be entitled to retain the benefit 
of it, even if that breakthrough came to them during their employment on research mandated by the 
employer. They may also be entitled to pursue it for themselves, as long as they do not misuse the 
employer’s time and resources in the process, or enter into competition with the employer in breach 
of their duty of fidelity or the fiduciary duties of some professional or managerial staff. 
Implications of the findings concerning time of the invention 
The implications of the other limb of UWA v Gray, in relation to when an invention is made for the 
purpose of determining ownership, are more universal, and obviously not limited to an academic 
environment. With the approach adopted in UWA v Gray there is a greater risk that an employer 
devotes considerable resources to “reduction to practice” of an invention only to find that an 
employee in fact had arrived at the inventive concept before commencing employment and on that 
basis claims sole ownership. Alternatively, it makes it more likely that a previous employer has such 
a claim because the employee arrived at the inventive concept in pursuance of a duty to research or 
make inventions for that employer.  
 It is of course possible to deal with the first alternative, where the employee has a claim to 
ownership which he does not hold on behalf of, or need to account for to his previous employer, by 
way of a contractual agreement with the new employer. Although it is not possible to vary or 
determine inventorship contractually it is possible to deal with ownership in express terms.46 In other 
words, it would be possible to provide, for instance, that the employer will be entitled to any patents 
an application for which is filed after the employee commenced employment, even if that employee 
conceived of the invention previously, as long as that invention relates to the employee’s present 
research duties.  
 Alternatively, it can be provided that the employee is entitled to the benefit of all inventions 
conceived before entering the firm’s employment, even if a patent with that employee as nominated 
inventor is filed during the period of employment. If an employee is under a duty to invent, conceives 
of an invention but only after termination, herself or through a later employer, files for a patent over 
that invention, then the claim of the first employer will have to prevail. So there are considerable 
difficulties attached to an employee contracting with a new employer in relation to inventions 
conceived of previously. Therefore it would be better to deny any rights to a future employer, by 
express contractual terms, in relation to inventions conceived in previous employment. The second 
option, in other words, presents less difficulty. If a dispute results, it is then logically only between 
the ex-employer and the inventor in her individual capacity. It need not involve the new employer. 
 Whatever the best option might be and this will depend on all the circumstances, the decision in 
terms of timing of inventions clearly suggest that some contractual solution be developed to cater for 
the kind of situation that emerged in UWA v Gray. This may not be straightforward, but at the very 
least considering this matter at the outset and in relation to termination of an employment relationship 
will bring potential issues with particular inventions to the fore. 
Sirtex cross-claim against Dr Gray 
Although UWA did not win against Dr Gray, Sirtex’ cross-claim against him was successful. A 
company established by various interests external to UWA, Sirtex was a vehicle for the 
commercialisation of technology associated with the disputed inventions. These were transferred to 
Sirtex in 1997 by Dr Gray and the Cancer Research Institute, a body established earlier to support his 
research. Sirtex was floated in 2000, and Dr Gray was then a Director of the company. UWA had no 
involvement with Sirtex.  
 
46 See Stack v Davies Sheppard (2001) 108 FCR 422; 51 IPR 513; Polwood Pty Ltd v Foxworth Pty Ltd (2008) 165 FCR 527; 
75 IPR 1. 
  By 1999, officers of UWA had formed the view that the university “might have some claim” in 
relation to the inventions it knew were being commercialised (UWA v Gray at [5]). The then Vice-
Chancellor, Professor Schreuder, wrote to that effect to Dr Gray. However, Dr Gray did not disclose 
this letter to Sirtex and furthermore, warranted in a deed “that to the best of his knowledge there were 
no pending claims or applications in respect of patents, know how rights or intellectual property 
rights” which were the subject of the transfer agreement (UWA v Gray at [1601]).47 In his general 
dealings with Sirtex at the relevant time, Dr Gray remained silent about UWA’s claims, although it 
was obviously in Sirtex’ interest to know about them before making commercial arrangements.  
 When UWA brought the action against Dr Gray in 2004 it naturally also sued Sirtex, claiming 
that it had knowingly participated in his breaches of fiduciary duties, and seeking orders that Sirtex 
held the inventions on trust for the university and requiring their transfer. Of course the UWA claims 
against Sirtex were ultimately dismissed, since they depended for their success upon the court 
allocating ownership of the inventions to the university. However, the fact that Sirtex won the case 
did not mean it had no losses because it had incurred considerable costs fighting the action, not all of 
which were catered for by the relevant costs order. The recovery of these legal expenses was the 
essential purpose of Sirtex’ cross-claim against Dr Gray.48 
 Finding for Sirtex, French J held that Dr Gray both breached his duties as a Director of Sirtex and 
engaged in misleading and deceptive conduct in contravention of s 10 of the Fair Trading Act 1987 
(WA) by not drawing to Sirtex’ attention correspondence from Professor Schreuder which clearly 
indicated that UWA could well inquire into its rights to the relevant intellectual property. His silence 
was “such as to convey the wrong impression that no possibility existed that UWA had or was likely 
to be interested in the intellectual property underpinning the Sirtex float” (UWA v Gray at [1611]). 
The court held that if Sirtex had been informed by Dr Gray, it would have been advised to make 
further inquiries of UWA, which would have afforded it the opportunity to ‘resolve the matter with 
UWA’ and avoid being exposed to the litigation at hand (at [1612]).  
 As French J said (at [1174]): 
In my opinion, despite this knowledge, [Dr Gray] decided not to disclose the possibility to Sirtex. In all 
likelihood that was because he took the view that there was not much chance that the University would 
follow through. He had convinced himself that the Schreuder correspondence was part of a tactic by 
Professor Robson to bring about his resignation. He had resigned and therefore there would be little or 
no purpose in UWA pursuing him. He took a calculated risk in not disclosing the correspondence to 
Sirtex. It was, as Sirtex alleges, a deliberate non-disclosure.  
 Some vague and indirect references to the state of his relations with UWA, conveyed to a 
solicitor involved with Sirtex who Dr Gray maintained should have inferred, because of his apparent 
general understanding of intellectual property policies at universities, that UWA might have had a 
claim, also did not constitute sufficient notice. 
The cost of proceedings  
The damage that befell Sirtex was identified by French J as the loss of the opportunity to avoid “the 
instigation of these proceedings and to resolve matters in advance with UWA” (UWA v Gray at 
[1612]). Quantifying this loss was left to a separate hearing before Barker J. Where damages for the 
deprivation of a commercial opportunity are to be assessed, they should be ascertained “by reference 
to the Court’s assessment of the ‘prospects of success of that opportunity had it been pursued’ ”.49 
Relying on the evidence contained in French J’s judgment, Barker J considered a range of 
hypothetical outcomes of an early approach by Sirtex to UWA. He concluded that: 
In the circumstances I consider it highly probable that not only would an inquiry from Sirtex to UWA 
have resulted in negotiations concerning the release from UWA of any claim of ownership to the 
 
47 It was found that other Sirtex directors were ignorant of the UWA claims. 
48 The measure and assessment of the damages became the subject matter of a separate hearing, referred to further below. 
49 University of Western Australia v Gray (No 28) (2020) 185 FCR 335 at [57]; [2010] FCA 586, citing a passage from Sellars 
v Adelaide Petroleum NL (1994) 179 CLR 332 at 355; [1994] HCA 4 (Mason CJ, Dawson, Toohey and Gaudron JJ). 
  
relevant intellectual property, but that an accommodation would have been arrived at, comprising a 
release given in consideration of a share allotment in Sirtex in favour of UWA in the forthcoming float 
of the company. For the reasons I have expressed above, I consider it highly probable that that share 
allotment would have come out of either the allotments earmarked for Dr Gray and/or CRI.50  
 However, Barker J then had to decide whether a discount should be applied based on the 
probability of the other hypothetical outcomes had Sirtex approached UWA: no settlement at all (and 
hence litigation); a settlement without any consideration; a settlement on the basis of a share issue 
alone; or a settlement with a royalty. Given the tone of some of the mutual communications and 
dealings, none of these possibilities was to be ruled out entirely. However, he considered them so 
unlikely as to warrant a discount of only 14%, to 86% of Sirtex’ legal costs as allowed. For Sirtex the 
financial consequences of Dr Gray’s failure to warn them had been considerable, as it incurred such 
costs and disbursements of over $5 million.51  
Recovering costs as damages 
Usually who bears the costs is finally decided by the court hearing the proceedings, the starting 
principle being that “costs ordinarily follow the event”. In other words, the party that wins will get 
their costs from the party that loses. Normally these costs are assessed (or “taxed”) on a party to party 
basis, although in some circumstances it is on an indemnity basis, which more closely approximates 
the real costs reasonably incurred.52 As Barker J points out: “That there may be a discrepancy 
between what the Court orders by way of party to party costs and on an indemnity basis has long been 
understood by courts and lawyers.”53 It is a fiction that benefits the losing side against which party to 
party costs are awarded, leaving the winner out of pocket. But a longstanding principle prevents 
recovery of costs as damages either in the primary or in a subsequent proceeding. Relevantly this 
means that a winning party cannot normally sue for a separate order for damages which could cover 
the shortfall between actual costs reasonably incurred, and the nominal costs awarded as assessed. 
Barker J held that this also applies to costs incurred in a primary action and claimed in a related cross-
claim, as was here the case. 
 However, Barker J also held that this longstanding principle was not absolute in its application. 
Having reviewed the authorities and some related academic writings he concluded that  
in a situation where a party is put to the trouble of maintaining an action or defending an action by 
reason of the wrongdoing of another party, and is entitled to an indemnity from that party, then absent 
usual principles such as those relating to mitigation of damage and the reasonableness of legal costs 
incurred, they should be able to recover as damages those costs expended either in a separate action 
subsequent to the primary action or in a related proceeding in the primary proceeding … In public 
policy terms, it may well serve the useful purpose of encouraging settlement of proceedings.54  
 Holding that the case at hand was just such a situation, Barker J found for Sirtex: its costs in the 
UWA proceedings were recoverable as damages against Dr Gray, by whose fault they had been 
incurred.55 Sirtex had already recovered $3 million based on the trial costs order against UWA, but 
this being on a party to party basis,56 it left a claimed shortfall of more than $2 million compared to its 
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 real costs. Barker J allowed the most substantial items claimed in their entirety: the legal costs and 
disbursements incurred in the proceedings, and those payed to Sirtex’ lawyers, Phillips Fox, prior to 
the trial. After disallowance of some lesser items, approximately $1.9 million was thus recoverable as 
damages from Dr Gray.  
Significance of full and frank disclosure 
The financial consequences for Dr Gray were thus considerable, and therein lies some sort of 
warning. Usually where intellectual property is spun out of universities, there are multiple parties 
involved: (co-) inventors, universities and departments, their multiple officers and administrators, 
institutional and corporate vehicles, backers and financiers. In such circumstances, chain of title is 
absolutely critical. Proper judgments about legal rights are entirely dependent on full and continuous 
disclosure by all interested parties, in good faith and with mutual confidence. Drawing on a private 
conviction that a claim is without merit or basis, or inspired by ulterior motives, carries the legal risk 
that the resulting failure to communicate relevant information breaches obligations under the 
corporations law and the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) or State fair trading laws. It is much better to 
err on the side of caution, given the complexities and uncertainties of the relevant law. Furthermore, 
in a practical sense, full and frank disclosure is an essential element of the diligence required from all 
parties for success in complex and long term R&D and commercialisation projects.  
Universities and inventions in the future 
An academic duty to invent? 
Universities might well infer from the trial and appeal courts’ reasons that to secure intellectual 
property rights academic contracts of employment should henceforth include a duty to invent. But it 
seems clear that placing academics under a duty to invent would fundamentally threaten the role and 
position of universities in society, because of the attendant implications, not the least of which would 
be that it would inevitably result in an obligation of silence. It would sit awkwardly with academic 
freedom, in terms of research direction and publication. A further issue might well be how to 
structure proper consideration adapted to the performance of this particular additional duty. 
 So it is unlikely that universities will consider following that course. More probable is that they 
will at least ensure their intellectual property statutes, regulations and policies are in proper order. 
Express provision is certainly preferable. 
No doubt most of those do and will continue to mandate a priori university ownership of academic 
inventions, with some employee entitlements. But one must now ask where there is a duty only to 
research and not to invent, the terms of any IP policy or regulation mandating university ownership 
have a legitimate basis.57 And even if so one might question whether a priori universally mandated 
rules are good policy, given the recurring examples of great dysfunction attending rivalrous 
relationships between university and academic.  
 Certainly the UWA v Gray decision points to the importance of some express provisions being 
agreed upon by academic employees and their universities at the outset of the employment 
relationship. Reliance on the default position is not desirable: it straddles in a complicated manner 
such varied areas of law as contractual terms implied by law; terms implied on the specific facts; 
fiduciary obligations; obligations of confidence based in contract and/or equity; and general 
employment law (eg, in relation to misuse of university resources). The approach to the relevant time 
of invention, now approved in two recent Full Court decisions, has added another aspect of 
uncertainty and difficult.  
 The Full Court also relevantly states the following about the desirability of the common law 
approach: 
while our conclusion recognises a distinction between the ownership of employee inventions in 
universities and in private sector business entities, we should not be taken as suggesting that the 
solution reached by use of the implied term in law is necessarily a desirable one in either case. What 
 
57 That much of the relevant research is actually funded from outside sources is one relevant consideration in this regard. 
  
we do emphasise is that there are clear reasons for not implying such a term as to inventions in a case 
such as this. If a less crude and more fair and reasonable result is to be achieved which balances the 
respective interests of a university and its academic staff members, this will need to be done by or 
under legislation or, if it could be devised, by an express contractual régime appropriate to the 
circumstances of the individual case.58  
How to structure IP policies? 
But what form should the terms of a university IP policy then take? Interestingly the Full Court’s 
statement seems to envisage that a solution either be devised “by or under legislation”, or by express 
terms “appropriate to the circumstances of the individual case”. That does not seem to allow much 
room for the present approach of most universities, which, as UWA attempted to do, promulgate 
some statute, policy or other IP instrument which purports to import universal terms into every 
contract of academic employment.  
 These most commonly envisage university ownership and a right to some remuneration for the 
academic inventor, and perhaps a department. But it is at the very least odd to give ownership to the 
employer where the making of inventions is entirely a matter of discretion for the employee, as it 
would continue to be in the absence of a duty to invent.  
 In fact, are such terms effective in the absence of a duty to invent being expressly added to the 
usual list of academic duties?59 Why should a university be entitled to an invention made by an 
academic employee who neither has the duty to, nor is being payed to invent, and is not under some 
associated obligation of confidence or secrecy?60 Alternatively, if a provision is expressed in terms of 
inventions made “in the course of employment”, or “under the contract of employment” or the like, if 
the making of inventions is not a duty under such contract, can the invention truly be said to have 
been made in the course of employment or under the terms of the contract? One can say that it was 
made at the time a person is employed by the university perhaps, but that is by no means the same 
thing. 
 Considering the question then, for argument’s sake, on the basis that either universities cannot 
validly incorporate a priori mandatory and universal terms, or alternatively that it is undesirable to do 
so, since it creates an incentive for staff to trade with others outside the university concerning their 
inventive ideas and concepts, how should universities approach the matter? We have to accept two 
factors: first, in the absence of a duty to invent in an academic employment contract, the position of 
the university is actually quite weak; and secondly, any argument based on fiduciary duties, except 
perhaps to some degree where an academic occupies a management position, is uncertain and will 
turn on the particular facts. As a result, the approach to patentable inventions in universities will have 
to be collaborative, incentive based and envisaging mutual benefit, good faith and respect.  
 First and foremost, universities must ensure that they can offer academics that are so minded 
effective assistance in bringing inventions to market. Universities must also recognise that wider 
collaboration is an essential component of both the research (eg, for the generating of external 
research funding as well as for the collaborative work itself) and the commercial stage. Co-ownership 
is perhaps an option and what the Full Court had in mind when writing the above quoted words, but 
arguably that is just as difficult as university ownership to achieve without a change in the 
Commonwealth legislation.  
Conclusion 
The only remaining option is that universities with the capacity to do so, encourage inventive 
academics to disclose their inventions to the university, on the promise of genuine and effective 
support and advice relating to the commercial route, and in exchange for a fair return and ongoing 
partnership if desired. Some financial inducement may be offered for that purpose. This approach 
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 implies abandoning the adoption of mandatory and universal a priori rules, regulations or policies in 
favour of voluntary and tailored ex post agreements.  
 With the making of such agreements in mind, an employee who is interested in the 
commercialisation of an invention should be required to notify the university so that it is guaranteed 
the first opportunity to treat with her and arrive at a tailored agreement. However, the academic 
should retain the right ultimately to refuse the university’s terms – the point is that the university as 
employer should not be denied the opportunity to treat with the employee, but that it is not in a 
position to enforce its will if the employee is not satisfied with what is proposed. 
 Universities should also publish to all academic staff optional model terms and their competing 
merits, clarifying the various legal, commercial and financial alternatives considered viable for the 
university and the individual. These may include shared ownership, university ownership with an 
employee royalty, employee ownership with university user rights or commercial rights etc. Only an 
open and communicative approach surrounding the advantages and limitations of the university’s 
involvement will encourage inventors to come forward, deal with the university on an equally frank 
and open basis (because not threatened by a university “land grab”), enjoy the benefits of the 
university’s relevant expertise, and have a continuing sense of involvement.  
 The employing university is in most cases the incumbent, the obvious first port of call, and 
provided it has the right approach and expertise, the organisational structure within which an ongoing 
employee would most often prefer to proceed. This ex post approach, based on an obligation to 
notify, and treating on terms particular to each individual case will allow the kind of flexibility that 
will maximise chances of success. 
